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WAIVER OF THE DELIVERY SCHEDULE IN
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-
A REVIEW OF THE 1967 BCA DECISIONS
E. K. GUBIN*
INTRODUCTION
The usual Federal Government contract contains a delivery schedule
setting out the dates when the goods or services must be delivered or
performed. Failure to deliver or perform on time gives the Govern-
ment the right' to terminate the contract for default.
But what happens legally if the Government does not terminate a
contract for default immediately after the due date stated in the deliv-
ery schedule? Must the contractor continue to perform? Does the
Government lose any of its legal rights?
Because all Government regulations' prescribe the type of investiga-
tion the Government must undertake prior to declaring a contract in
default, it is obvious from a practical sense that rarely can the Govern-
ment complete its investigation in time to declare a contractor in default
the day after a contract delivery date has passed.
The period during which the Government is making its investigation
to decide whether or not it will exercise its right to terminate for default
is called the "forebearance period." A later section in this article will
discuss facts indicating forbearance, and the length of time during
which forbearance can exist.
-A.B., 1926, LL.B., 1928, University of California. Member of the Bar of: United
States Supreme Court; U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit; U.S. Court of Claims;
U.S. Tax Court; U.S. District Court (N.D. California); Supreme Court of the State
of California.
1. All Government default clauses, e.g., ASPR 8-707, state: "The Government may
• . . terminate . . . any contract," and all Government regulations, e.g., ASPR 8-602.1,
state: "... the Government has the right . . . to terminate . . ." any contract where
the contractor fails to deliver on time. The words "may" and "right" indicate clearly
that the issuance of a default notice when a contractor is technically in default is
discretionary, not mandatory.
2. ASPR 8-602.3 lists seven factors to be considered by the Government in deter-
mining whether or not to terminate a contract otherwise in default. But, BCAs will
not review the exercise of Government determination where a contractor is legally
in default. R. M. Cantrell & Sons, ASBCA 7680, 1962 BCA 3320.
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Where performance extends beyond the due date of a contract, the
Government, as the nondefaulting party, must make a choice between
two alternative and inconsistent rights. It may elect either: a) to allow
continued performance of the contract; or b) to refuse to go on with
the contract.' An election to permit continued performance under the
contract is frequently referred to as a waiver of delivery schedule.4
The Government may exercise only one of these two rights. Hence,
an election to permit continued performance of the contract would
necessarily preclude the Government from exercising its alternative right
to stop performance of the contract, i.e. the right to declare the contract
in default.
A determination of whether the Government has elected to permit
continued performance under the contract must be made through an
examination of the particular facts of each case. Because the year 1967
produced more board 5 cases on waiver than during any previous year,
this article, in a later section, will review in detail the 1967 waiver cases
to indicate the pattern of facts which must be found before waiver will
be held to exist.
CONTINUED PERFORMANCE WITHOUT WAIVER
The concept of waiver should not be confused with the extensions
of time traditionally granted by the Government to a contractor, other-
wise in default, by means of a bilaterally executed supplemental agree-
ment or contract modification. These time extensions are specifically
recognized by Government regulations. 6 The contractor usually gives
the Government some "consideration" for an extension of time granted
after he is legally in default or about to become so, even though there
is some question as to whether the Government has the authority to
3. 5 W.usioN ON CoNTRAcrs t 683 (3rd ed. 1961).
4. Cuneo, Waiver of the Due Date in Govermnent Contracts, 43 VA. L. REv. 1, 9
(1957), AFPI 8-601.51 states: "In the event the contractor becomes delinquent under
the terms of the contract delivery schedule, or any extension thereof, the Government
may be considered to have waived or abandoned the delivery schedule under certain
circumstances."
5. There were 12 waiver cases decided in 1967, while only 3 were decided in 1966.
Of the 12 cases, the Board found waiver to exist in 7 cases, and in 5 cases held no
waiver existed.
6. ASPR 8-602.4 titled Governnzent Procedure in Lieu of Terndnation for Default,
permits "the contractor . . . to continue performance of the contract under a revised
delivery schedule," when in the best interest of the Government.
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extract such consideration.7 These extensions of time do not fall into
the waiver category because by executing the supplemental agreement,
which specifically recognizes that no waiver exists, the parties effectively
prevent the existence of facts which might otherwise appear to be a
waiver.
Even without the execution of a bilateral agreement, the Govern-
ment sometimes can prevent the existence of waiver by sending an appro-
priate notice to the contractor when the delivery date expires,8 or even
by including a paragraph, specifically stating that no waiver is intended
by the actions of the Government in any communication between the
parties at a time when waiver might otherwise factually exist.'
LENGTH OF FOREBEARANCE PERIOD
The introduction to this article indicated that failure to terminate on
the exact delivery date, by itself, is not sufficient to be considered a
waiver. The reasoning is that in a practical sense, it is impossible for
the Government to issue its termination notice that rapidly, particularly
because of the investigation the Government is required to undertake
prior to issuing its notice of default.' °
From the decided cases, it would appear that the Government is
allowed a reasonable time, or "forebearance" period, after passage of
7. Parkside Clothes, ASBCA 4148, 60-2 BCA 2760. Even though ASPR contains
no wordage requiring a contractor to give "consideration" to the Government when
a delinquent delivery schedule is extended by agreement between the parties, Defense
Procurement Circulator No. 51 (Feb. 3, 1967) clearly states that "reasonable monetary
or other consideration will be obtained, if appropriate.' (AFPI 8-602.3 (i) (b) (2) and
54-3006 as well as NPD 30, 101.5 [31 [a] [1) discuss consideration.)
8. While ASPR does not provide for a letter of this type, AFPI 8-602.3 (iii) (b) (2)
provides for such letter "in exceptional situations where neither default action nor
extension of delivery is appropriate." The sample letter itself is found in AFPI 8-871
(c) (2).
9. The decision in Adec, Inc, ASBCA 12367, 67-2 BCA 6483, mentions a letter
from the Government containing the following paragraph:
Any assistance rendered to the contractor on the contract or acceptance
by the Government of delinquent goods or services hereunder will be
solely for the purpose of mitigating damages, and is not to be construed as
an intention on the part of the Government to condone any delinquency
or as a waiver of any rights the Government may have under subject
contract.
But a mere disclaimer letter is not of itself binding where other facts in the case
show existence of waiver. See Mavrgy Instrument Corp., ASBCA 11644, 67-2 BCA
6480.
10. Supra note 2.
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delivery date, during which time the investigation takes place. The
period of forebearance is not the same in every case, but the pattern
appears to be that the shorter the time frame between accrual of the
default and its exercise by the Government, the more likely the issuance
of a decision holding forebearance to exist. Thus, periods ranging from
one week to three and one-half months have been held to be forebear-
ance, not waiver,1 while periods of three to four months have been held
to result in a waiver.'2 The fact that the contractor is continuing work
under the contract will also shorten the time of the forebearance
period."3
The foregoing discussion involves only the mere passage of time dur-
ing which the Government does nothing. But, what happens if, besides
the passage of time, the Government takes some affirmative action? Will
such action be construed as indicating waiver, or absence of waiver?
The answer depends on the detailed facts of the case.
While it is difficult to place a short label on waiver facts, the follow-
ing two sections of this article will place a short label on certain selected
facts, with the caveat that surrounding circumstances often may change
the label. The importance of surrounding circumstances will be brought
out clearly in the final sections of this article where the twelve waiver
cases decided in 1967 will be discussed in factual detail.
FAc-rs PROVING WAIVER
The existence of facts proving waiver usually involve Government
actions which clearly affirm the Government's apparent view that con-
tract performance should continue after the due date, irrespective of
the contractor's act of default and regardless of the passage of the due
date. The following Government actions have been held to indicate
waiver: acceptance of samples or preproduction units; 4 acceptance of
11. Atlantic Fish v. United States, 116 F.Supp. 574 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (8 days); Campbell
v. Hauser Lumber, 147 Wash. 140, 265 P. 468 (1928) (14 days); Acme Litho, ASBCA
2878, 56-2 BCA t 1091 (3/z months); Speedcon, ASBCA 2523 (1955) (1 month); Arndt,
ASBCA 2445 (1955) (2 months); The Taylor Corp., ASBCA 1795 (1954) (3/2 months);
Canova Silk, ASBCA 4327, 58-1 BCA 1680; Midwest Engineering, ASBCA 5390, 1962
BCA 3640 (56 days).
12. Sherwood v. Gordon Bros., Inc., 116 N.Y.S. 2d 306 (1952); United Boat, ASBCA
2452 (1955).
13. Ace Electronics, ASBCA 11496, 67-2 BCA 6456.
14. Buhl Optical, ASBCA 1702 (1954); Aladdin Toy, ASBCA 1818 (1954); Nutt
Mfg. Co., ASBCA 3594, 57-2 BCA t 1480; Aviators Equipment, ASBCA 5924, 61-1
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deliveries; 15 acceptance inspection;' 6 issuance of change orders, substi-
tution of specifications, and/or issuance of supplemental agreements; 7
encouraging the contractor to continue to perform; 8 negotiations con-
cerning proposed contract amendment; 9 and, waiver of preproduction
delivery schedule.2 °
While generally a "do nothing" position of the Government indi-
cates forebearance rather than waiver, there are certain instances where
the failure of the Government to take actions required by the contract
may indicate the existence of waiver. Typical examples are failure to
approve contractor's drawings-needed prior to the start of production2'
and failure to approve contractor's preproduction samples.22
FACTS PROVING ABSENCE OF WAIVER
Facts proving that waiver does not exist usually involve Govern-
ment actions which affirm its intent not to waive the delivery sched-
ule. This intent is often established through Government documents
or letters accompanying those documents which affirmatively state no
waiver exists or is intended through failure to issue a default notice
after the delivery date has passed.
The following Government actions have been held to indicate that
no waiver is intended: issuance of show cause letter not involving de-
livery schedule;2 limited operational tests by Government inspectors
at plants;24 acceptance of partial deliveries; "5 acceptance of partial
BCA 2945; Industrial Chamberheat, ASBCA 6128, 61-1 BCA 2883; Heat Exchangers,
Inc., ASBCA 9349, 1964 BCA 4381.
15. Star Metal, ASBCA 2012 (1956); Speedcon, ASBCA 2523 (1955); Roosevelt
Paper, ASBCA 1861 (1954).
16. Assoc. Aircraft, ASBCA 7255, 1963 BCA 1 3739; BMC Industries, ASBCA 9391,
1964 BCA 4213.
17. Industrial Lamp, ASBCA 1825 (1954); 6 Contr. Cas. Fed. 61594; Kilgore, Inc,
ASBCA 1616 (1954); Steel Products, ASBCA 2605 (1955); Acme Litho, ASBCA 2878,
56-2 BCA 1091.
18. Goodrich, ASBCA 2760, 58-1 BCA 1624.
19. Superior Fuse, ASBCA 6585, 61-2 BCA 3226.
20. Aviators Equip. Corp., ASBCA 5924, 61-1 BCA 2945; Heat Exchangers, Inc.,
ASBCA 9349, 1964 BCA 4381.
21. Remsel, ASBCA 5899, 61-1 BCA 2909; Emerson, ASBCA 6004, 61-2 BCA 3248.
22. Aviators Equipment, ASBCA 5924, 61-1 BCA 2945.
23. M. Ten Bosch, ASBCA 7470, 1963 BCA 3696.
24. Universal Transitor, ASBCA 5664, 61-1 BCA 3024.
25. United States v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1963); Comp. Gen. Dec.
B-150515, 43 COMP. GEN. 1; Park Tissue Mills, ASBCA 5769, 1963 BCA 3747.
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delivery after show cause letter;2 issuance of ten day notice to bring
forth evidence of excusable delay, after earlier waiver;27 signing of
formal modification or agreement on revised delivery schedules, or place
of manufacture; 28 discussions with contractor on progress; 29 recom-
mendation of approval for Title I relief; 30 failure to answer contractor's
request for time extensions; 31 but under certain circumstances, the fail-
ure of the Government to respond to a request for a time extension has
been held to be a waiver."
The last two examples in the above paragraph, which appear to be
contrary if basic action only is viewed, indicate clearly why the facts
of each individual case must be reviewed in complete detail before
accepting any label for the decision in that case. It is for this reason
that the balance of this article will review in detail the specific facts
of the twelve waiver cases decided by boards of contract appeals in 1967.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION OF 1967 BCA CASES SUPPORTING
EXISTENCE OF WAIVER
Forebearance period of three months is unreasonable, where Govern-
ment induces continued performance.
Consideration is given in Ace Electronics Associates, Inc."3 to the
26. All-Design Screw, ASBCA 6590, 1962 BCA 3592.
27. Engineering Enterprises, ASBCA 5527, 60-1 BCA T1 2647.
28. Zielinski Co., ASBCA 5848, 60-1 BCA 2642; Skyway Clothing, ASBCA 3244, 56-2
BCA 1120.
29. Sanitary Sleep, ASBCA 5846, 60-1 BCA 2641.
30. United States v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1963).
31. Midwest Engineering, ASBCA 5390, 1962 BCA 3460.
32. Jo-Bar Mfg. Co., ASBCA 11391, 66-2 BCA 5949.
33. Ace Electronics, ASBCA 11496, 67-2 BCA 6456. In addition to its discussion of
forebearance, the decision contains the citations of the leading pre-1967 cases on waiver,
as well as an excellent summary of the law, in the following excerpt:
The rules and legal principles concerning waiver of delivery schedules,
as contrasted with mere "forbearance" to terminate, have been the subject
of numerous decisions of this Board. Representative of these are the appeals
of Nutt Manufacturing Company, ASBCA No. 3594, 57-2 BCA 1480; Ross
Meehan Foundries, ASBCA No. 4823, 59-1 BCA 2113; Harvey-Wells
Electronics, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 4987 and 5033, 59-1 BCA 2185; Clad In-
ternational Corporation, ASBCA No. 4813, 59-2 BCA 2385; Sanitary Sleep
Products Corp., ASBCA No. 5846, 60-1 BCA 2641; Lumen, Inc., ASBCA
No. 6431, 61-2 BCA 3210; L. W. Foster Sportswear Co, Inc., ASBCA
Nos. 5754, er seq., 62 BCA 3364; Instruments for Industry, Inc., ASBCA
No. 10543, 65-2 BCA 5097; Therm-Air Mfg. Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 11047,
66-1 BCA 5672; Systems Research and Development Co., ASBCA No.
10952, 66-2 BCA 5888; and other cases cited therein. A comprehensive
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doctrine of forebearance in Government contracts. The case involved
a contract for potentiometers, for which First Article tests reports were
due on Nov. 18, 1965. Failing to submit them on that date, Ace Elec-
tronics was requested by the Government on Nov. 29, 1965, to suggest
a firm and realistic delivery schedule with which the company definitely
could conform. Ace Electronics replied that the test reports would be
completed by Dec. 28, 1965. On Dec. 7, 1965, the Government sent a
ten day show cause letter, to which the contractor replied on Dec. 13,
1965, stating in part that the test reports would be submitted during
the week of Jan. 4, 1966. Without any further correspondence or
communication occurring between the parties, the Government on Feb.
18, 1966, terminated the contract for default. Three days after receipt
of the notice for default termination, Ace Electronics dispatched the
required test reports to the Government. All testing had been per-
formed under the surveillance and in the presence of Government
inspectors.
According to the decision in this case, upon a contractor's failure to
discussion of this problem is contained in Cuneo, Waiver of the Due Date
in Government Contracts, 43 Va. L.R. 1 (1957). See also Department of the
Army Pamphlet 27-153, 1961 Ed., Procurement Law, pp 374-375.
Based on these sources, it appears well settled that since a contract re-
mains in force after a breach unless the non-defaulting party manifests an
election to terminate it, upon a failure to perform on or before the con-
tract due date, the Government must within a reasonable time after such
breach elect whether to terminate for such default or to permit continuance
of performance. After breach the contracting officer is entitled to take
sufficient time to determine what action will be in the best interest of the
Government. At any time during this interval of time, known as a period
of "forebearance," the contracting officer may elect to terminate for de-
fault without the risk of waiving the original delivery schedule. What will
constitute a reasonable period of "forbearance" depends upon the circum-
stances of the particular case. Thus, if the contractor is vigorously and
actively proceeding with efforts to perform, a reasonable time for such an
election would be shorter than where the contractor is no longer making
any substantial effort to cure his default and in consequence not incurring
material additional expense or obligations. Mere silence and inaction with-
out more on the part of the Government will not constitute an election to
permit continued performance. However, where the Government, with
knowledge of the circumstances, through the conduct and actions of its
agents, encourages and induces the contractor to continue with perform-
ance and to incur further expense in connection with such performance,
such conduct has been held to manifest an election to extend the time
originally specified for performance. Under such circumstances the con-
tract may no longer be terminated for failure to deliver by the previous
due date.
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perform on the due date established by the contract, the Government
must decide whether it will terminate for default or permit continued
performance of the contract. The Government need not choose its
course of action immediately upon the contractor's default, but is en-
tided to a period of time, known as a period of forebearance, in which
it may decide what conduct would be in the Government's best inter-
ests. During this interval, the Government may elect to terminate for
default without running the risk of waiving the original delivery sched-
ule. However, the Government is allotted only a reasonable period of
time in which to make its decision, and what constitutes a reasonable
period of forebearance depends upon the circumstances of the particular
case. Thus, if the Government has reason to know that the contractor
is proceeding with its efforts to perform and thereby incurring costs,
a reasonable period of forebearance will be shorter than in a case where
the contractor is doing nothing in reference to the contract.
Mere inaction and silence on the part of the Government can not be
deemed an election to permit continued performance. In order for
Government actions to be considered a manifestation of its intention to
permit continued performance, the Government must through its con-
duct encourage and induce the contractor to continue working and
incurring costs in relation to the contract. Under such cirumstances,
the time originally specified for performance is held to have been ex-
tended and the contract cannot be terminated for failure to deliver by
the previous due date. Once the Government has waived the original
contract schedule, there must either be an agreement with the contrac-
tor to establish a new schedule, or the contracting officer may unilater-
ally establish a due date if notice of this date is given to the contractor
and if the date is reasonable under the circumstances of the case. How-
ever, notice after waiver, setting a reasonable time for performance
need not be given in the following circumstances: 1) where the de-
faulting party abandons the contract; 2) where performance of the con-
tract as it was contemplated has become impossible; and 3) where both
parties have treated the contract as terminated. Moreover, those cases
holding that all the Government must do after waiver is wait a reason-
able time and then issue default termination, without setting a new due
date, are all cases where the contractor was not making any material
effort to perform after expiration of the due date.
Under the circumstances of the Ace Electronics case, it was found
that during the interval after receipt by the Government of the con-
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tractor's letter of Dec. 13, and prior to the receipt by the contractor
of the Government notice of default termination, a reasonable period
of forebearance had expired. The Government was held to have in-
duced Ace Electronics to continue tests of the potentiometers, thereby
manifesting a willingness to permit continued performance of the con-
tract and waiving the original delivery schedule. Since the Government
neither agreed to a new delivery schedule, nor gave Ace Electronics
notice of a new schedule setting a reasonable time for performance,
the termination for default was deemed premature.
Forebearance period of two and one-half months is unreasonable, 'where
Government aware of contractor's continued performance.
The question of what constitutes a reasonable period of forebearance
is the main concern in Maurey Instrument Corporation.3 4 There, after
several time extensions had been granted by the Government in a con-
tract for potentiometers, Feb. 1, 1966 was established as the delivery
date. Since Maurey Instrument delivered nothing on that date, the
Government immediately issued a ten day show cause letter, which
contained a statement to the effect that any assistance rendered to the
corporation should not be construed as a waiver of any Government
rights under the contract. Maurey Instrument replied on Feb. 4, ex-
plaining that although every effort was being made to complete the
contract, difficulty with a vendor was causing the delay. After further
communication from the contractor and a meeting at which Maurey
Instrument and the Government discussed the corporation's problems
and a possible new delivery schedule, the Government, without prior
notice, on April 15, 1966, terminated the contract for default.
It was found that since no deliveries had been made on or before the
due date specified in the contract, it was necessary for the Government
to decide whether to terminate the contract for default or to allow
Maurey Instrument to continue with performance of the contract. The
Government was further held to be entitled to a reasonable time in
which to make that decision.
Upon receipt of the contractor's Feb. 4 letter and from contacts with
the contractor after that date, the Government became aware of the
fact that Maurey Instrument had not abandoned the contract and was
spending time and money in an effort to perform. The cause of delay
and the probable time when Maurey Instrument could begin delivery
34. Maurey Instrument Corp., ASBCA 11644, 67-2 BCA c, 6480.
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were also known to the Government. Given these factors, it was de-
cided that under such circumstances, "it should not have taken more
than a few days to terminate the contract for default if that is what
the contracting officer was going to do." Hence, the Government's
delay from Feb. 7 to April 15, 1966, was considered unreasonable and
unjustifiable in light of the particular facts of the case. The Govern-
ment was deemed to have elected to permit continued performance
beyond the original contract due date, and hence, could not terminate
for default for the contractor's failure to deliver on or before that date.
Government request for a proposed revised delivery schedule 'waives
original schedule.
The Wilkinson Manufacturing Company case 35 involved the effect of
a Government request that the contractor submit a proposed delivery
schedule differing from that required by the contract. The contract, as
modified in March, required a preproduction sample to be delivered in
ninety days with delivery installments to commence sixty days after
approval of the sample. The sample was approved Nov. 19 (which
would have required first production deliveries in January), but on
Nov. 20, Wilkinson requested a meeting "for the purpose of discussing
and revising the delivery schedule." The meeting was held on Dec. 16,
with disputed testimony as to whether the Government or Wilkinson
first presented the details of a new schedule, and whether the Govern-
ment or Wilkinson first used the words "proposed realistic delivery
schedule."
The day after this meeting, Dec. 17, the Government wrote a letter
requesting "a realistic proposed delivery schedule," and Wilkinson, on
Dec. 24, submitted the schedule which Wilkinson alleged had been
first presented by the Government at the Dec. 16 meeting, calling for
first production deliveries in March. The Government rejected that
schedule, and instead insisted Wilkinson adhere to the schedule set out
in the contract modification, i.e., first production deliveries in January.
On Feb. 11, the Government terminated the contract for failure to
deliver on time.
The conclusion reached by the Board was that even though no new
delivery schedule had been established or agreed upon, the original
schedule, as it existed in the modification, had been waived by the
35. Wilkinson Mfg. Co., ASBCA 9860, 67-1 BCA i 6165.
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request for the new schedule and thus the Government was obligated
to establish a new and reasonable schedule prior to any default action.
Waiver of sample and test report delivery waives production delivery
schedule.
In Delta Semiconductors, Inc.,3 6 the effect of Government waiver
of a sample and test report delivery schedule was considered. In a con-
tract for semiconductor devices, requiring submission of samples and
test reports by Aug. 22 and deliveries by Nov. 7, sample and test reports
were submitted to the Government on Aug. 22. These samples and
reports were rejected as inadequate, with additional clarification re-
quired. In reply to Delta's offer to submit a new test report by Nov.
30, the Government on Nov. 15 wrote that it would "forebear further
action pending receipt . . . no later than 5 December 1966, of the test
report. . ." However, no contract amendment was ever issued to
change the delivery of production items. The test report was submitted
by the contractor two days late (on Dec. 7) and was returned un-
opened, with the Government terminating the contract for default on
Dec. 30.
It was held that the Government letter agreeing to forebear further
action pending receipt of the test report by Dec. 5, waived the contract
production delivery schedule, apparently on the theory that the original
long lead time for completion of production deliveries after submission
of samples and reports (Aug. 22 to Nov. 7, i.e. seventy-five days) indi-
cated that similar lead time for production deliveries after Dec. 5 should
have been allowed. In the absence of a contract amendment establish-
ing a new, realistic production delivery schedule, the Government was
bound to follow a reasonable course of action with regard to delivery
of contract items. The Government's refusal to accept the test report
because it was two days late and its termination of the contract for
default three weeks after delivery of the late report were considered
to be unreasonable under the circumstances.
Negotiations to modify specifications waives existing delivery schedule.
Consideration was given in Monitor Plastics Company37 to the effect
which negotiations to modify specifications have upon the delivery
36. Delta Semiconductors, Inc., ASBCA 12285, 67-1 BCA T 6357.
37. Monitor Plastics Co., ASBCA 11187, 67-2 BCA 6408.
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schedule of a contract. Monitor failed to deliver four sonar dome test
panels on the specified delivery dates in March and April. After deliv-
eries were due, the Government decided to allow additional time for
performance and entered into negotiations with Monitor to modify the
original contract specifications, without ever conceding that these speci-
fications were defective. On May 27, the Government submitted a
supplemental agreement containing changes in specifications suggested
by Monitor, but also containing one change never discussed between the
parties. On June 2, Monitor requested deletion of the undiscussed re-
quirement and received no response in spite of numerous requests for
a decision. Without answering the request, the Government, on Oct.
26, terminated the contract for default on the basis of the original
delivery schedule.
It was held that even though no new delivery schedule was discussed
or agreed upon, the original delivery schedule was waived in view of
the fact that the Government agreed to grant Monitor additional time
and then entered into negotiations to modify the contract specifications.
Stress was placed upon the fact that the Government was entitled to
terminate the contract for default when the contractor failed to deliver
on time, but this right was abrogated by the Government's actions. In
addition, since no new delivery schedule was ever established, the con-
tractor was to be granted a reasonable time in which to perform. It
was held that the new period of performance was tolled by the nego-
tiations which were never concluded because the Government failed to
resolve the dispute over the modifications of the specifications.
Negotiating new work method and allowing contractor to proceed
according to that method waives original delivery schedule.
The Lemesany Roofing and Insulation Company case38 discussed the
effect of allowing a contractor to continue performance after the due
date in the contract has passed without the establishment of a new due
date. Lemesany contracted to construct a roof, with the completion
date originally set for Jan. 15. Work on the project began late and
proceeded slowly because of poor weather conditions and material sup-
ply difficulties. On Jan. 9, the Government sent a show cause letter
to Lemesany, allowing it ten days to explain the cause of delay and the
measures it would take to correct the situation. Lemesany replied with
a suggested procedure for completing the roof. On Jan. 14, all work
38. Lemesany Roofing and Insulation Co., IBCA 533-12-65, 67-2 BCA 6413.
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on the project was halted and during the remainder of January and most
of February, meetings were held between the parties to decide upon
the method for completion of the contract. Agreement was reached on
such method with the Government outlining this in a letter on Feb. 25.
Lemesany accepted this method by letter on Feb. 29. Work commenced
again under the new method on March 16. However, the contractor's
progress was constantly hampered by bad weather. On April 3, the
Government terminated the contract for default.
By choosing to allow Lemesany to proceed beyond the original due
date of the contract under a new method of work, the Government was
deemed to have waived adherence to that date. (Outlined in the deci-
sion were three possible methods for establishing a new completion date
after the Government has waived the original one.) Thereafter, the
Government could only terminate after establishing a new date (which
it did not do on Feb. 25), or waiting a reasonable time for performance,
which latter action is "fraught with all of the dangers that accompany
ambiguity and uncertainty."
Government failure to accept or reject contractor's proposed revised
delivery schedule and consideration of change in specifications suggested
by contractor constitute waiver.
In Hydro-Electronics Corporation,9 just after the award on May 20,
1966, of the contract in question, the contractor went into bankruptcy.
It had at that time several Government contracts, most of which were
in varying stages of delinquency. At a meeting with the Government
in August, the contracts were sorted to decide which should have
priority of performance and to establish tentative revised delivery sched-
ules for them. To protect Government interests in the subject contract,
which was not yet delinquent (the contract delivery due date was Sept.
20), a cure notice was sent with respect to it on Aug. 9, 1966. Hydro-
Electronics responded on Aug. 23 with a proposed delivery schedule,
which called for the first delivery on Oct. 24, 1966, and the final de-
livery on Dec. 5, 1966. At no time was the contractor advised whether
this proposed delivery schedule would be granted. However, due to
problems with suppliers and difficulties at its plant, Hydro-Electronics
met none of the due dates in its proposed schedule. On Nov. 16, the
Government acknowledged and considered a recommendation made by
Hydro-Electronics for a cost-saving change in specifications. Further-
39. Hydro-Electronics Corp., ABSCA 12199, 67-2 BCA T 6651.
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more, during November, the contractor, with the knowledge of the
Government, began substantial work on the contract. On Dec. 14, 1966,
the Government issued a show cause letter, to which Hydro-Electronics
replied on Dec. 20 proposing a new delivery date of March 6, 1967.
This proposal was never answered, but work on the contract continued
until a termination for default was issued on Jan. 13, 1967.
Under these circumstances, it was found that the Government agreed
"tacitly" to extend the Sept. 20 delivery date to a date later to be agreed
upon. In addition, the first two dates of the contractor's Aug. 23 pro-
posed delivery schedule were admittedly waived by the Government.
Hence, it was held that before the right to terminate for default could
be reinstated, the Government was required to fix a new and reasonable
delivery date. Since no such date was established, the termination for
default was improper. Furthermore, the Government's conduct, es-
pecially in entertaining Hydro-Electronics' recommendation for a
change in specifications, induced the contractor to continue with per-
formance and expenditures in an effort to complete the contract. Under
these circumstances, it was found that a reasonable delivery date had
not arrived at the time of the termination for default.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION OF 1967 BCA CASES DENYING
EXISTENCE OF WAIVER
A waiver of delivery schedule accompanied by the establishment of a
-zew schedule does not result in an indefinite waiver even though the
-zew schedule is not formalized by the issuance of a change order.
Demonstration after issuance of default notice does not waive earlier
default determination, where affirmative Gover'nment actions inducing
'continued performance by the contractor are not present.
Decision Systems, Incorporated° offers authority for the proposition
that no indefinite waiver of the contract due date occurs when the
parties agree to a definite extension of delivery date, even though such
extension is not granted through the issuance of a formal order. Further,
in order for the Government to be regarded as having waived a ter-
mination for default by its conduct after the date of termination, it
must take affirmative action which indicates that the contractor is to
proceed with performance of the contract.
In this case, the contractor was required to deliver three card reader
40. Decision Systems, Inc., NASA BCA 94, 67-1 BCA 6097.
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memory storage systems. On May 18, 1964, Decision Systems informed
the Government that because of design problems, it could not meet the
original delivery schedule and requested that the due date be extended
to July 9, 1964. In its reply letter of June 1, the Government ac-
quiesced in the extension of time, stating it would withhold default
action until July 9, but that failure to deliver at that time would result
in a termination for default. Deliveries were not forthcoming on July
9, and the contract was terminated for default on July 15, 1968. After
the date, Decision Systems in numerous communications with the Gov-
ernment continued to seek reinstatement of the contract, but its requests
were constantly denied, as evidenced by an Aug. 1 Government tele-
gram, which stated that the default action was being continued. Still
seeking reinstatement of the contract, Decision Systems held a demon-
stration on Sept. 21, which was attended, at the corporation's request,
by Government representatives.
The Board held that the June 1 Government letter did not extend
the time for performance indefinitely. The contractor's argument that
lack of a formal order extending the delivery date constituted an in-
definite waiver of the original contract due date was rejected explicitly.
Since the Government may, without waiving the delivery schedule al-
together, withhold default action for a reasonable time in order to enable
the contractor to deliver, the conclusion was that the June 1 letter did
not constitute an indefinite waiver of the delivery date, but simply
granted an extension of time until July 9, as Decision Systems had
requested.
Further, the termination for default was not deemed to have been
waived by Government actions subsequent to the termination date of
July 15. During that time, Government communications with Deci-
sions Systems, which communciations were exemplified by the Aug. 1
telegram, were not considered to be an inducement to continue per-
formance of the contract, since they merely affirmed the contracting
officer's July 15 decision.
In addition, because there was no evidence that the Government rep-
resentatives attending the Sept. 21 demonstration conducted themselves
in such a manner as to indicate that Decision Systems was no longer in
default, attendance of the demonstration could not be regarded as a
waiver of the termination for default.
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Waiver of first portion of installment delivery contract can be termi-
nated by a new show cause letter allowing a reasonable time for delivery
of entire contract.
In Utopia Precision Machine Service,"' the doctrine of waiver and
later termination of such waiver was viewed in relation to an installment
contract, where a series of four show cause letters had been issued at
each of the contractor's failures to deliver on time. The subject con-
tract called for the fabrication and delivery of support tubes in install-
ments due 60, 90, 120, 150 and 180 days after award. Upon the
contractor's failure to meet the first scheduled delivery date of Nov. 8,
1964, the Government issued its show cause letter of Dec. 9. Utopia's
reply cited machine breakdown and difficulties encountered by subcon-
tractors as the cause of delay. When there were still no deliveries
forthcoming, on Feb. 23, the Government issued a second show cause
letter, to which Utopia replied on March 2, 1965, advising that difficulty
encountered by yet another subcontractor was the cause of delay. In
response to the third show cause letter of April 15, 1965, the contractor
again informed the Government by letter of April 23, 1965, of problems
which were hampering progress of the contract. The Government
issued on July 16 its fourth and final show cause letter, to which no
reply was ever made. The contract was terminated for default on Aug.
13, 1965.
The Board stated that "the Government at some point and no later
than the second show cause letter dated 23 February 1965 chose not to
hold the contractor to the delivery schedule as established by the con-
tract...." However, the effect of this waiver was deemed terminated
by April 15, 1965 when the Government again threatened default
despite the excuses offered by Utopia for failure to deliver. Thereafter,
the contractor was required to perform within a reasonable time. The
time between April 15 and the date of termination on Aug. 13, a period
of four months, was held to be sufficient for a capable contractor to
commence deliveries, especially since that period constituted double the
lead time provided for in the contract. Hence, the termination for
default under these circumstances was considered proper.
Although not stressed in the opinion, the facts indicate that Utopia
did little under the contract, and actually no further work was done
even prior to the date of the first show cause letter, except to subcon-
41. Utopia Precision Machine Service, ASBCA 11177, 67-1 BCA 6100.
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tract that work to another contractor who was attempting to perform.
The failure to perform by Utopia and its subcontractor was held to
result "from their own inadequacies."
Encouraging contractor's continued performance and discussions con-
cerning performance problems are not sufficient to constitute 'waiver,
especially where there is no production, no delivery and no evidence
of any significant additional expense incurred after the initial date of
delinquency.
Allied Paint Manufacturing Company, Inc.4 2 advanced the proposition
that the Government must act affirmatively to set aside a previous deliv-
ery schedule before waiver can exist. Encouraging a contractor to do
his best and negotiations re inspections are not such acts. Allied Paint
entered into a requirements contract on July 7, 1964, to supply paint
to GSA, the purchase orders under the contract having due dates rang-
ing from Oct., 1964, to Feb., 1965. After delivery of a number of
orders, the contractor encountered inspection problems, etc. Confer-
ences concerning these problems were held with GSA personnel over
a period ending in Jan., 1965. At these meetings, the Government
became cognizant of the fact that Allied Paint was experiencing difficul-
ties, and the possibility of terminating the purchase orders without
liability was investigated. No indication was ever given to the contrac-
tor by the Government that the orders in dispute were to be terminated
for default, until the issuance of the termination for default notice on
Feb. 10, 1965.
According to the decision, there was lacking in this case any evi-
dence that GSA ever engaged in conduct which affirmatively set aside
the established delivery dates for the disputed orders. Hence, the fact
that Allied Paint "was seeking relief and that GSA discussed many times
the possibility of affording such relief, does not in itself amount to
a waiver of the right to call for delivery at the stipulated times," nor
was the Government's encouragement of Allied Paint to do the best
it could sufficient to amount to an affirmative action equivalent to a
waiver.
Consideration was given in the decision to previous cases where
waiver was found to exist. Lumen43 was held to differ from the Allied
Paint situation because in Lumen there was an express written waiver
42. Allied Paint Mfg. Co., Inc., GSBCA 1488, 67-1 BCA 6387.
43. Lumen, Inc., ASBCA 6431, 61-2 BCA 1 3210.
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of the original delivery schedule, while the instant case provided no
example of any similar conduct to establish a sufficiency of acts amount-
ing to waiver. Also, Foster Sportswear4 was considered inapplicable
on the basis that Foster concerned the reasonableness of a new delivery
schedule, established after waiver, which was not involved in Allied
Paint.
In addition, the decision placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact
that Allied Paint did nothing with respect to the terminated orders,
except try to obtain manufacturing ingredients, and that no evidence
of production, delivery or additional expense, incurred after the initial
date of delinquency, existed. Cited with approval was Comp. Gen. Dec.
B-150515, 1 July 1963, 45 holding that a contractor's actions in attempted
continued production, including expenditure of funds, must be coupled
with affirmative Government action to encourage continued perform-
ance, before waiver results.
Forebearance period of two months, after show cause letter, is not
'waiver, especially 'where Government failure to act does not cause con-
tractor's additional expenses.
Mark Associates, Inc." concerned the question of what constituted
a reasonable time after the delivery date expired (forebearance period)
for the Government to decide whether or not to terminate a contract.
In a contract, awarded March 28, 1966, for reproducer coils, installment
delivery was to begin on June 24, 1966, and end on or before Aug.
24, 1966. No communication had transpired between the parties during
44. L. V. Foster Sportswear Co., ASBCA 5754, 62 BCA 3364.
45. 43 Comp. GEN. 1. This decision involved an attempt on the part of the contractor
to have GAO set aside an earlier decision by ASBCA in Seaview Electric Co., ASBCA
7189, 1962 BCA t 3331, which held no waiver existed in spite of the expenditure
of funds by the contractor after the delivery due date. Apparently, the contractor
submitted evidence of waiver to GAO which had not been previously submitted to
the Board because the GAO decision stated:
Evidence has been furnished us to the effect that the contracting officer's
representative urged Seaview on many occasions during December 1960 and
early January 1961 to expedite delivery of the several small initial ship-
ments which were made after November 29, 1960. We believe this evidence
has a very material bearing on the question whether the Government led
Seaview to believe its default had been 'waived.' However, none of this
evidence was presented to the Board of Contract Appeals. In the light of
the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Bianchi, decided
June 3, 1963, we believe our review of the Board's decision must be limited
to the record before the Board.
46. Mark Associates, Inc., ASBCA 12346, 67-2 BCA 6459.
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the period from March 28 (date of contract award) until Nov. 25.
Since no deliveries had been made by Nov. 25, 1966, on that date, the
Government forwarded a ten day show cause letter to Mark Associates.
'In the contractor's reply of Dec. 6, the delay was attributed to difficul-
ties encountered in obtaining component parts, but the promise was
made to begin deliveries on Dec. 16. Neither further communication
nor any delivery of units took place, with the Government terminating
.the contract for default on Feb. 9.
It was found that Mark Associates' failure to deliver within the ex-
tended time granted it, conferred upon the Government the right to
terminate the contract for default. However, the Government was
entitled to a reasonable time in which to decide whether or not it would
terminate. The Government was found to have acted in a timely fash-
ion and hence the termination for default was deemed proper. There
was no requirement for the Government to act sooner, since there
existed no proof that Government failure to act occasioned the con-
tractor's additional expenses, nor that the Government was aware of
any such expenses. Further, according to the decision, no duty rested
upon the Government to communicate with Mark Associates prior to
terminating the contract for default and failure to do so can not render
the termination for default improper.
Regular visits of Government industrial specialist to contractor's plant
after issuance of show cause letter is not waiver.
The issue in Adec, InC.47 was whether continued regular visits to a
plant by a Government industrial specialist after issuance of a show
cause letter constituted a waiver of the delivery schedule. Here a con-
tract to furnish loudspeakers provided for delivery in four installments
commencing on Dec. 3, and ending on March 3, 1967. The contractor
failed to deliver the first increment on Dec. 3, and on Dec. 16, the Gov-
ernment sent a show cause letter, which contained a statement to the
effect that any assistance rendered Adec should not be construed as a
waiver of any Government rights under the contract. In its reply of
Dec. 29, 1966, Adec explained the reasons for its delinquency and pro-
posed a revised monthly delivery schedule commencing April 30. It con-
tinued work on the contract in an effort to deliver in accordance with
this proposed revised delivery schedule. However, by letter of Jan. 10,
1967, the Government rejected the contractor's proposed revised deliv-
47. Adec, Inc., ASBCA 12367, 67-2 BCA 6483.
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ery schedule. Adec's response of Jan. 18 requested that default action
be withheld pending presentation of data to establish excusable delay
and suggested that delivery might be made earlier than April 30.
After the issuance of the Dec. 16 show cause letter, a Government
industrial specialist visited the contractor's plant every three weeks, as
he had done prior to the issuance of the show cause letter. During these
visits, he performed his regular job of checking on delivery progress
and trying to assist by expediting delivery of needed items, as he always
had done in the past, even on other contracts. The Government ter-
minated the contract for default on March 10, 1967, seven days after
expiration of the last delivery date originally established in the contract.
The Board did not cite or attempt to distinguish earlier ASBCA
decisions holding that acceptance, inspection or encouraging contractor
to continue performance' waives the delivery schedule, so presumably
the Board believed that inasmuch as the Government industrial spe-
cialist was performing merely his normal duties when he visited Adec's
plant after the show cause letter had been issued, the continuation of
his normal activities did not waive the original delivery schedule. The
Board also stated there was no showing that Adec's efforts to deliver
after receipt of the show cause letter were in reliance upon Govern-
ment actions. Hence, the termination for default was deemed proper.
SUMMARY
The doctrine of election to permit continued performance under a
contract after the delivery date has passed is more popularly called
waiver of the delivery schedule in the field of Government contract
law. It is not a new doctrine, but the upsurge of BCA cases in 1967,
resulting in seven decisions in favor of waiver and five decisions against
waiver, indicated that a review of these cases was appropriate to see if
"anything new has been added" to the waiver doctrine.
Prior to 1967, the emphasis in Board decisions appeared to be on
Government actions indicating encouragement for continued perform-
ance as distinguished from mere acts of forebearance. The 1967 cases,
while continuing to stress the need for existence of affirmative Govern-
ment actions seem to place a little more emphasis on the existence of
the contractor's actions indicating continuing efforts towards perform-
ance in reliance on the Government acts of waiver. These contractor
actions include purchase of additional tooling or materials, continued
48. Supra notes 16, 18.
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production, partial delivery, or any similar action which proves the
contractor suffered financial detriment by relying on the Government
actions.
While the pre-1967 cases often mentioned detriment to the contractor
as constituting a portion of the waiver picture, the facts of such detri-
ment were not presented in the same detail as found in the 1967 cases.
Accordingly, any capsulized 1967 definition of waiver would be no
different than the pre-1967 definition and would include the require-
ment that affirmative Government acts of waiver must be coupled with
detriment to the contractor, resulting from such affirmative Government
acts, in order for waiver of delivery schedule to exist.
The foregoing definition would explain what otherwise might appear
to be inconsistencies in the end result of three 1967 cases involving fore-
bearance. A period of two and one half months and a period of three
months were both held unreasonable and waiver was held to exist where
the contractor had expended funds during that period, whereas a fore-
bearance period of two months was held reasonable where the contrac-
tor had not expended funds during that period.
While labels are difficult to affix, especially on waiver cases, the fol-
lowing affirmative Government actions indicating waiver were found
in 1967: request for proposed delivery schedule; failure to promptly
accept or reject proposed delivery schedule; negotiations to modify
specifications, and even consideration by the Government of changes
in specifications; negotiation and adoption of a new work method; and
waiver of schedules involving preproduction samples and test reports.
Facts held not to constitute waiver in 1967 included: existence of
waiver plus new and reasonable schedule for delivery thereafter;
waiver of first installment portion, plus allowance of reasonable time
for delivery thereafter; encouraging continued performance without
production or detriment; traditional plant visits of Government in-
dustrial specialists; and demonstration of equipment after issuance of
default notice.
Because most board decisions involve sifting through the tangled
and often disputed web of facts presented both by the Government
and the contractor, the board member often must issue what could
be called a jury verdict as to the facts. During such sifting, if there
appears to exist a pattern showing Government actions which could
be construed as an election to permit the contractor to continue to
perform, plus actions on the part of the contractor indicating financial
[Vol. 10:58
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detriment during such continued performance, a board will usually
hold that a waiver of delivery schedule has come into existence.
After waiver the Government must send notice to the contractor
establishing a definite time for performance thereafter before any new
default notice can be issued, and such time must be reasonable, taking
"into consideration the situation in which the contractor is at the time
of such notice." 49
Therefore it would appear that a contractor's lawyer in arguing a
waiver case before a board should make certain that complete facts
be presented showing affirmative acts of waiver on the part of the
Government as well as detriment to the contractor resulting from
such acts. In defending a claim of waiver before a board, the Gov-
ernment lawyer also must present precise facts proving the non-
existence of affirmative acts of waiver mentioned in this article, and
negating any detriment to the contractor caused by such acts.
49. Ace Electronics, ASBCA 11496, 67-2 BCA 6456, explained why certain earlier
ASCBA decisions approved of default after waiver even though the Government did
not physically establish and give notice of a new delivery date but merely waited a
reasonable time before issuing the default notice. In reviewing these earlier cases,
the Board in Ace noted that in the earlier cases " . . . there was no evidence of any
material efforts on the part of the contractor to continue with performance, in that
the contractor in fact incurred no expense in connection with such performance." The
Board then stated:
It is well established that notice after waiver, setting a reasonable time for
performance, need not be given where the defaulting party disaffirms or
abandons the contract or where performance of the contract as contem-
plated is no longer possible or the contract has been treated by the parties
as terminated. Where the choice of an alternative right by one entitled
to it is not followed by action of the other based on justifiable reliance so
that the situation of the parties has not materially changed so as to make
a new choice unfairly prejudicial, notice need not be given.
FPR 1-8.602-3 (a) specifically requires the Government to send a notice setting a new
date for delivery, after waiver exists. However, ASPR is silent on the question of notice
after waiver.
